Indústria de cimento em Moçambique competição, pauta aduaneira e uso de capacidade

Abstract

In the first years of national independence, in 1975, the national industry began to accumulate a depreciation of its production levels, most of the factories had been nationalized. In 1987, the government tried an attempt to reverse this situation by introducing the Economic Rehabilitation Program, which advocated the restructuring and privatization of the industries then held by the State, in the first years of its implementation the program failed to modify the industry's decline. The cement industry was no exception. Before national independence, it produced at levels that allowed it to place its products (clinker and cement) on the domestic and foreign markets. But, with national independence, the company was no longer private and became state-owned, its factories began to function poorly and well below the level of installed capacity, causing the industry to lose a large part of its market, until mid-year. 1996, the factories were semi-immobilized. Based on information collected from Cimentos de Moçambique and surveys of the company's main managers, the work analyzes (i) obstacles to the use of productive capacity (ii) the impact of customs tariffs on the international competitiveness of the cement industry (Hi) a its competitive efficiency at the international level and (iv) the causes of the abundance of imported cement in the national market. With the results obtained, it is concluded that (i) the level of capacity utilization is low due to the weak demand for cement; (ii) demand for domestic cement is weak because the domestic market is small and faces competition from imports with current low costs; (Hi) the abundance of imported cement is due to the lack of competitiveness of the national cement industry; and (iv) the two customs tariffs evaluated, from June 1991 and from October 1996, protect and encourage the national industry to produce, this protection being more expressive in the 1996 tariff, currently in force. However, these two analyzed guidelines do not encourage product exports. The customs tariff of June 1991 contained a structure of five rates from 5% to 35%, where most consumer products were taxed between 5% and 25%, raw materials and intermediate goods between 1% and 25%, the machinery at 5%, other capital goods between 5% and 25% and unprocessed food 25%, and the tariff for exports was 5%. The new tariff, introduced in November 1996, simplified the tariff structure, reduced higher rates and changed the designation of the general customs fee rate, incorporating it into the customs duty rate, and setting export duties at 0%. The effective rate of protection reveals that the customs tariff has protected the cement industry and the revised tariff in 1996 protects more than the old one. Furthermore, the domestic cement industry is not competitive: domestic cement sales prices at the factory door are between 20% to 24% above imported cement c.i.f. In a short-term scenario, the cost ratio of domestic resources used in production is higher than that of importable resources (valued in foreign currency): industry applies between 1.05 and 1.22 units of domestic resources per unit of foreign currency saved. The effective rate of promotion for the cement industry's exports was negative, but later with the new tariff, it went to almost zero, because the customs rates on raw materials were reduced from an average of 16% to 6% and exports of the final product stopped paying customs duties, whereas before they paid 5%.(TRADUÇÃO NOSSA)